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In this paper we analyze two recent right-leaning governments: the administrations of Chilean President Sebastián Piñera (2010 Piñera ( -2014 and the first year of Argentine President Mauricio Macri (2015-) . We seek to understand whether and how the ideological shift has influenced social protection in these two countries. The findings reveal that the recent turn to the right in Latin America bares little resemblance to the experience of social policy reform in the 1980s and 1990s. Neither country has experienced outright social policy retrenchment. Instead, the kinds of policy reforms carried out by the right-leaning governments reflect a more complex process of policy drift and privatization creep in some sectors, and marginal expansions in other areas. In this way, Latin America's swing right has produced a form of welfare politics that is more similar to the experience of advanced industrialized democracies than previous findings suggested. As in advanced welfare states, our analysis reveals that this combination of policy drift and expansion is explained by policy legacies and the strength of the opposition. Previous policies generate gaps that require reforms and generate popular support that makes retrenchment difficult. The electoral and mobilizational strength of the left in opposition also inhibits outright retrenchment. The inclusion of Brazil as a shadow case in the concluding section of the paper provides a note of caution.
Recent social policy initiatives enacted by right-wing President Michel Temer suggest that in contexts of severe economic and political crisis, more overt forms of retrenchment could still be feasible in Latin America.
2 Previous research has supported the idea that economic crisis generates pressures for welfare state retrenchment in the region (Madrid 2003; Stallings 1992 ).
In the pages that follow we analyze social policy reforms undertaken by President Piñera and the initial social policy agenda of President Macri. Most social policy reforms take place at the beginning of new administrations, both because presidents enjoy enough support to make it possible and because frontloading popular policy decisions can benefit their parties in midterm elections. Even in the case of Chile, Piñera's primary initiatives were carried out during the first two years in office. We, therefore, contend that the analysis of Macri's first year in office provides important insight into the administration's goals and orientation. Drawing on newspaper articles, legislative debates, and secondary sources, we find that neither Macri nor Piñera engaged in outright retrenchment of existing social policies, yet there was retrenchment through policy drift, and in both cases the administrations made marginal expansions to pensions and conditional cash transfers (in Argentina) and maternity leave (in Chile), but did not expand public services.
Existing Research and Theoretical Expectations
Studies of the welfare state find that the politics of expansion and retrenchment are different. Theories that explain expansion of the welfare state focus on politicalinstitutional and economic factors. Political-institutional arguments point to the impact of strong left parties and union mobilization (Huber and Stephens 2001; Dion 2010) , political institutional design (Immergut 1992) , policy legacies (Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Anochea 2016) , and regime type (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2010) .
Other scholars note that economic factors, namely growth levels (McGuire 2010) trade openness (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985) , and the socio-political effects of neoliberal reforms (Ewig and Kay 2011) also shape the expansion of social policy.
Studies of welfare state retrenchment find that scaling back social programs can take many forms, ranging from the most overt and outright (privatization, program elimination, and deep spending cuts), to more minor changes (tightening eligibility requirements and introducing conditionality), to passive measures such as policy drift (Pierson 2001; Hacker 2004) . These minor and passive changes, as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) explain, can have important consequences. Policy drift is one example of incremental change, in which rules are formally the same but their impact changes due to shifts in external conditions. It occurs when, for example, a state maintains status-quo spending levels, but the demand for benefits goes up; when a state increases the level of income transfers at a lower rate than inflation; or when the state underspends the budget on particular sectors. In such settings, the generosity of benefits or program coverage will be negatively affected, thus resulting in de-facto retrenchment (Hacker 2004) .
Conservative governments in advanced European welfare states have tended to use these more complex forms of retrenchment -such as policy drift-rather than outright roll-backs. This gradual form of retrenchment responds to the role of political institutional factors, policy legacies, and economic variables. Specifically, a large number of veto points helps protect against social policy cut-backs (Pierson 1994 (Pierson , 2001 Huber and Stephens 2001; Castiglioni 2005 ). Policy legacies can also limit retrenchment by making reforms unpopular (Pierson 1994 (Pierson , 2001 Huber and Stephens 2001; Brooks 2009 ). In Latin America, however, several studies show that outright retrenchment was feasible in the 1980s and 1990s, due to economic crises, capital account openness, and pressure from international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (Madrid 2003; Rudra 2008) . Others note that reforms were facilitated by the weak state of democracy, civil society, and left parties (Huber and Stephens 2000) .
Our paper builds upon and refines this existing literature by exploring whether outright retrenchment continues to be feasible in Latin America. We find that the region's experience of democratic consolidation and left-party rule has generated a political context in which outright retrenchment is costly and unlikely. Instead, and similar to the case of advanced industrialized democracies, parties of the center-right in Latin America are more likely to retrench by means of policy drift and may even face incentives to marginally expand some programs. Similar pressures as those in advanced industrial 6 democracies explain this outcome: policy legacies and the strength of the opposition.
Policy legacies, or the design of previous policy, influence current reforms in two ways.
First, they help define what reforms are necessary. For example, a health policy that expands access to public services without building new infrastructure, may create overcrowding and wait-lists, putting pressure on the government to address the problems. The gaps and challenges created by existing policy design helps determine when and where governments concentrate their social policy efforts. A second way that policy legacies shape the direction and nature of reforms is by structuring the preferences of actors (Ewig and Kay 2011) . Where existing policy offers broad coverage and high quality benefits, the programs will enjoy popular support, making retrenchment prohibitively costly.
The second variable in our framework is the strength of the opposition. We contend that opposition strength is made up of three factors: (1) electoral strength, (2) the share of seats in the legislature, and (3) mobilizing capacity. First, where center-left parties pose a viable threat in the Presidential election (i.e. where the election was won by a narrow margin), right-wing candidates are likely to adopt a centrist approach to social policy that maintains popular programs. These parties may even commit themselves to expanding social policy in settings of strong competition from the left. Such promises of expansion are most likely in the case of income transfer policies because parties can more easily claim credit and reap electoral gains. This is because voters easily understand where transfers are coming from and therefore can reward that party in elections (Niedzwiecki 2016) . In addition, expanding transfers tends to be cheaper than making structural reforms to social services.
A second element of opposition strength relates to the share of legislative seats that the opposition holds. We argue that where the opposition maintains a majority in at least one chamber, policy reform is likely to be more progressive because of the ability of left/center-left parties to shape reform during the legislative debate. In addition,
Presidents that do not have majorities in the legislature tend to develop proposals that may not fully respond to their party's preferences but have a chance of passing. The third element of opposition strength is mobilizing capacity. When opposition parties have ties to strong and mobilized civil society organizations, they will have a better chance of influencing the President's agenda and the policy process through pressure in the street.
Policy legacies and opposition strength are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining policy reforms. They are contributing factors. In fact, a given outcome (maintenance, retrenchment, policy drift, or expansion) can be achieved through different causal paths that involve different dimensions of the two variables (Goertz and Mahoney 2012) . For example, while the expansion of pensions in Argentina is partly explained by strong linkages between the opposition Peronist Party and unions, the expansion of maternity leave in Chile did not respond to mobilized civil society with linkages to the opposition, but mostly to a highly competitive Presidential election. In both cases, policy legacies were key for understanding the reform process. This moderation in the discourse made Macri an acceptable candidate for defenders of social rights (Freytes and Niedzwiecki 2016; Semán 2015) .
The strength of the opposition is also manifested in the legislative seat share of left parties and in their ties to mobilized civil society. In Chile, RN's coalition faced strong opposition from the center-left Concertación, which controlled 47.5 percent of seats in the lower house and 50 percent in the Senate (Emol 2009 ). Though Chile's center-left parties did not enjoy strong ties to the mobilized student movement, these parties were still able to influence legislation. 5 In Argentina, Macri currently governs with a legislative minority. After the elections, PRO and its allies controlled only 35 percent of national deputies and 16 out of 72 national senators. Frente para la Victoria and its allies held almost a two-thirds majority in the Senate and were the main force in the Lower Chamber (Freytes and Niedzwiecki 2016) . In addition, the Peronist Party (and Frente para la Victoria, in particular) has ties to strong unions and other organized groups in society. As a result, the party has both electoral and mobilizational strength.
Despite both countries enjoying overall strong legacies and left opposition, we observe variation within countries across policy sectors. The within country strategy allows us to probe our explanation for why right-leaning governments might pursue retrenchment by policy drift in some sectors and marginal expansions in others. In particular, the precise nature of policy legacies and the level of opposition vary across policy sectors. This variation helps explain differences in outcomes within countries.
Finally, the two countries provide an interesting contrast because in one (Chile), the turn to the right occurred during the final years of the commodity boom, and therefore, the government faced a favorable economic climate and limited external pressure to scale back spending. In Argentina, Mauricio Macri's victory came after the end of the commodity boom. The price of Argentina's main export, soybeans, fell by 40 percent in 2014. Economic growth averaged a meager 1 percent and the fiscal deficit was increasing. By 2015, inflation was also on the rise (Murillo 2015) . In this context, it becomes easier to shift the blame for adjustment policies and use social policies to appease opposition in Congress and in the streets. 6 Blaming the previous administration for the economic problems, the government implemented a number of austerity policies, such as increasing the price of basic utilities and public transportation, and laying off thousands of state employees. The difference in economic context, however, does not explain the similar outcomes that we observe in the two countries.
Still, it is possible that the lack of outright retrenchment in Argentina and Chile partially results from the absence of severe economic crisis. Thus, to further probe the role of economic crisis, we include Brazil as a shadow case in the conclusion of the paper. Between the fourth trimester in 2015 and the same trimester in 2016, Brazilian GDP contracted by 2.5 percent. GDP growth dropped from a peak of 7.5 percent in 2010
to -3.6 percent in 2016 (IBGE 2016) . The country, therefore, provides a better sense of whether economic crisis makes outright retrenchment more feasible.
In the next section of this paper we analyze the key social policy initiatives of President Piñera and President Macri. We identify four potential policy outcomes:
expansion, maintenance of the status quo, retrenchment through policy drift, and outright retrenchment. We define outright retrenchment as reforms that involve the elimination of programs, spending cuts, or privatization. The unit of analysis in this study is a country's policy sector. We select the main sectors in each country in which there have been important reforms either in the previous or current administrations. Our findings suggest that Macri and Piñera have mostly maintained the status quo, while also retrenching through policy drift (and creeping privatization in healthcare). Moreover, in both countries the right-wing governments have expanded cash transfer programs (yet decreasing the real value of transfers in Argentina), but done virtually nothing to improve social services. Table 1 presents a summary of our findings. when the center-right government approved law (20,545), which extends the maternity leave benefit from three to six months and increases access by facilitating the formalization of workers that were not contributing to the social security system. The law also provides the possibility of mothers and fathers to share the final three months of the leave (Staab 2012) . President Piñera's commitment to maternity leave emerged during the 2009-2010 electoral campaign after his opponent voiced support for a proposal to extend the country's leave to six months (Blofield 2016 ). Chile's maternity leave was already quite generous by international standards, but its coverage was limited because many women work in the informal sector. Previous attempts to raise the issue had been ignored during the 1990s and early 2000s because of concern about the potential cost for employers (Staab 2012 ) and labor market discrimination against women (Blofield 2016 ).
Piñera's original proposal sought to expand coverage, extend the length of leave, and allow fathers and mothers to split the additional 12 weeks. It also attempted to ease labor market regulations related to sick leaves and protection from dismissal. These elements were quickly criticized by unions and other civil society organizations, and were eventually eliminated from the law. During congressional debate, opposition politicians also managed to increase the ceiling for income replacement during maternity/family leave (Staab 2012) . 7 The end result is a maternity/family leave law that expands access while providing a generous benefit. Critics note that the law does very little to encourage men to take leave (and in fact only increased the leave available to men by one day), but that the reform constitutes progress for working women, especially those who do not have a labor contract (Blofield 2016 ).
Our theoretical framework helps explain the content and timing of Chile's new maternity leave law. First, the importance of strong electoral competition and a tightlyfought presidential election pushed President Piñera to prioritize the issue (Blofield 2016) . Moreover, the increase in the ceiling for the income replacement emerged as a result of congressional debate, following demands from left-leaning parties. Policy legacies help explain the reform's approval as well. The fact existing maternity leave policy did not impose a cost on employers was crucial in avoiding opposition from the right. Staab (2012) argues that Piñera was able to get his coalition behind the initiative, in part because the benefit is funded through general revenue, and therefore, employers did not incur an additional cost. The existing system of maternity leave had also generated negative consequences for private health insurance firms, thereby increasing the incentives for right parties to take interest in the reform. Under the previous system, mothers who returned to work after three months of leave often found themselves having to request sick leave when infants fell ill. Under Chilean law, sick leave is financed through health insurance. Blofield (2012) notes that as sick leave requests increased throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, private health insurance companies began to grow alarmed about growing costs and supported the extension of maternity leave. Since the RN and UDI parties enjoy a strong relationship with Chile's private health insurance firms, this policy legacy facilitated the passage of the reform.
Education
The area in which Piñera was the least active, despite growing student protest and demands, was education. Beginning in 2011, Chile witnessed a wave of intense student protests. University and secondary students took over schools, mobilized, and organized strikes. The student demands included calls for free, high quality, and universal public education, including university. The response of the Piñera administration was sluggish;
it responded by increasing education spending and creating a quality monitoring agency.
Spending on education increased from around 4 percent of GDP (in years 2008-2011) to 4.6 percent in 2012 (Cepalstat 2016) , but no structural reforms were enacted to address the students' demands. In this way, Piñera's approach to education was status-quo with a slight increase in spending. The fact that such intense protests did not provoke a significant policy reform is largely explained by policy legacies, which have weakened the public education system and made it difficult for demands for structural reform to gain traction. Additionally, the fact that the parties that made up Chile's center-left
Concertación coalition did not have strong ties to the student movement, meant that the opposition did not push Piñera to engage in a deeper reform. Moreover, the President's coalition partner, the right-wing UDI party, has historically been especially supportive of
Chile's voucher (education) system and has a sustained record of resisting reforms that curb public subsidies to private providers (Pribble 2013) . This made it difficult for the RN to respond to student demands without endangering the viability of their right-wing coalition. The result was status-quo maintenance of education policy.
Another area where the Piñera administration upheld status quo policy was in the and finishing a drug rehab program (Cecchini, Robles, and Vargas 2012) . While several studies note that the overall transfer is larger than that provided by Chile Solidario, the precise increase is difficult to assess since the third pillar of payments is not guaranteed.
The Chile Solidario benefit was small, totaling roughly US$21 for the first six months, US$16 for months 7-12, and US$11 for months 13-18 (Pribble 2013, 76) . which allows those enrolled in the public sector to seek care in private clinics (subsidized by the state). The initative would have further extended public transfers to the private sector and while the bill was not approved, the general trend toward increasing public transfers to private clinics is likely to weaken Fonasa over the long term. We contend that this privatization creep is a form of policy drift, as it leaves the public healthcare system vulnerable. This is because rather than investing in public infrastructure and capacity, the right-wing government transferred funds to the private sector, where prices are higher.
Over time this may serve to strengthen private clinics and providers at the expense of public hospitals, leading to a de-facto privatization in healthcare.
Policy legacies played a strong role in this trend toward increased private sector involvement. Chile's private clinics and health insurance firms (Isapres) are very strong due to the design of previous policies and the country's right-wing parties are supportive of these actors (Pribble 2013) . It is, therefore, of little surprise that Piñera turned to the private sector to boost performance. Additionally, weaknesses in the design of Plan AUGE, namely the fact that public sector under-funding was not resolved, helped to prompt Piñera's push to address the problem of wait lists. The tightly fought presidential election also shaped the policy outcome. Turning public healthcare responsibilities over to private actors allowed Piñera to make quick progress on the challenge of wait lists, which is important in a setting of a strong opposition. Indeed, investing in public infrastructure, while beneficial in the long term, would not have provided Piñera and the RN with the ability to claim credit for "resolving" the problem. Thus, the policy also reflects the way that a strong opposition party influences social policy decisions. The Council is accountable to the two chambers (every six months) and has three years to prepare a unified pay-as-you-go universal system (Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina 07/22/2016, Art. 12). Finally, provincial governors that influence the votes of representatives in Congress, received an important concession: the national government would fund the debt of provincial pension funds (Origlia, July 31, 2016) .
Social Policy Reforms during the first year of Macri's administration (2015-)

Pensions
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After these modifications were introduced by the Peronist opposition in coalition with unions, the reform was approved.
The bill also increased the amount of some contributory pensions to avoid more pensioners' law suits against the state. This last element of the reform only covered pensioners in the contributory system, excluding all those that receive non-contributory pensions. Since non-contributory pensioners tend to come from the lowest income brackets, the reform generates increased stratification between labor market insiders, who had enough contributions to retire and now receive an increase in their income, and those who do not have enough contributions to access the contributory system. Finally, the President decreed an adjustment in the formula to increase the amount of contributory pensions for those who retired after August 2016 (Ybarra, June 30, 2016; Stang, July 25, 2016b ; Presidencia de la Nación 07/27/2016; Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina 07/22/2016).
Macri's pension reform does not retrench the system and could even be a move towards expansion, but only if the universal elderly pension has no expiration date. The temporal reach of the reform is unclear. This is because the legislation passed in congress created a universal regime with no termination date. However, the Presidential decree that implemented the law defined a three-year termination date (in July 2019) (Presidencia de la Nación 07/27/2016). The President hopes to enact a new overarching pension reform law before the three-year period expires. Such a measure would likely include an increase in the retirement age.
The expansion of Argentina's pension system under Macri's leadership resulted from a combination of policy legacies (i.e. the need to enact a reform due to the moratorium's expiration) and a strong Peronist opposition -in alliance with unions-that shaped the proposal presented by the president and the final content of the bill. Macri included incentives to opposition legislators in the design of the bill, and the opposition extended the moratorium, the payment of provincial debt, and the incorporation of a union representative in the council in charge of designing a new system.
Social Assistance
Macri's government expanded the eligibility criteria of the main CCT while (Lewkowicz, June 16, 2015; Clarín, July 16, 2015) .
Following the requirement in the law, Macri's government increased the CCT in March 2016 from AR$700 to AR$808 (Verón, February 12, 2016) . However, this increase took place in the context of increasing inflation and increases in the price of utilities that decreased the actual value of the transfer. The increase did not keep up with the rate of inflation, which was 35 percent in the City of Buenos Aires compared with the year before (INDEC 2016) . 13 The increase in the amount of transfer in a context of higher inflation is an example of policy drift.
Given the popularity of the CCT, Macri had promised not to eliminate it during his electoral campaign (Cappiello, July 21, 2015) . Once in office, the administration even increased the policy's coverage with a World Bank loan. The increase was initially a onetime expansion aimed at including children who had never accessed the CCT or who had lost the benefit due to not having national IDs and for not complying with education conditionalities. In addition, the expansion of coverage modified the eligibility criteria by extending contributory family allowances to the self-employed affiliated with the simplified tax system (monotributo) (Arza 2016) . The expansion of eligibility for family allowances was a move towards expansion. In addition, the government returned 15 percent of the VAT of purchases with ATM cards (the same used to withdraw benefits) to the recipients of this CCT, among others (La Nación, July 19, 2016) . Finally, the current administration announced a proposal to ease the eligibility criteria to temporary workers and to beneficiaries of provincial programs (Jueguen, February 18, 2016; Obarrio, April 16, 2016 , April 17, 2016 Basavilbaso, April 26, 2016) .
While the popularity of the policy (i.e.: legacies) in a context of competitive presidential elections (i.e: opposition electoral strength) explain the lack of outright retrenchment, the linkages of the opposition with strong mobilized sectors partly explains the nominal increase in the amount of transfer and the expansion of coverage. Many of the macroeconomic adjustment policies proposed by the executive, such as the decrease in the subsidy of basic utilities, particularly affected the most vulnerable sectors of the 24 population and therefore CCT recipients. These policies produced increasing mobilization in the streets. Previously fragmented peak union organizations reunified in opposition to Macri's austerity policies, the depreciation of wages in a context of increasing inflation, and layoffs. A major national newspaper that supports the new administration explained that public announcements to increase the amount of the transfer, increase its coverage, and the return of VAT to recipients responded to Macri's goal of containing the increase in poverty (from 29 to 32.5 percent from December to April) and social unrest produced by his adjustment policies (Obarrio, April 10, 2016) .
Since the government took power in December 10, 2015, there has been intense mobilization and protest against its policies. Figure 1 shows the total number of protests against the Macri government each month from December 10, 2015 to August 31, 2016.
The data is taken from the report of public mobilizations in the main national newspaper, La Nación, which is generally supportive of the government. 
Healthcare
The analysis of the health system also includes a combination of two strategies:
maintenance of the overall system's status quo and defunding of a policy aimed at sexual education (i.e.: policy drift). Argentina's health system includes three components -a publicly-financed sector (administered by provinces and some municipalities), social insurance funds (obras sociales mostly administered by unions), and a private sector.
Macri's administration sent a positive signal to unions in the context of increasing street protest (see Figure 1 ) by paying an outstanding debt of around U$D 180 million to obras sociales administered by unions (Rosemberg, August 03, 2016) .
In the public system, the previous Frente para la Victoria administration had strengthened primary healthcare through the distribution of free medicine (Plan Remediar) and through the reimbursement to public clinics and hospitals for services Nacer's aim of developing clinical histories of users of the public system. The novelty was the proposal to potentially increase public funding for the provision of healthcare to obra social contributors (formal workers) who use the public system. The obra social does not currently reimburse that spending. In addition, the government expressed Macri's intention to extend the coverage of basic illnesses included in the contributory health insurance system to those using the public system (Czubaj, August 04, 2016) . has not formally repealed the policy, it has delayed the transfer of funds and has not opened up the training for teachers (Carbajal, July 07, 2016) . Underspending what was allotted in the budget is one way to produce policy drift and retrenchment by default.
Until October 2016, Macri's administration had not made any structural reforms to the health system. This is largely due to policy legacies, namely that previous policy design created powerful stakeholders (such as unions) and programs that enjoy widespread popular support. The underspending in the Sexual and Reproductive Program is an example of policy drift that could be motivated by ideological considerations.
Cross-Country Comparison and Conclusions
Right-wing Presidents in Argentina and Chile did not outright retrench social policies that had been expanded during the previous left-wing governments, but instead engaged in a more complex form of retrenchment: policy drift. The administrations also maintained the status quo in some public services, while slightly expanding select income transfer policies. We contend that this expansion of income transfers is likely aimed at boosting the right-wing parties' popularity and makes good sense because such policies require a minimal investment and are ideal for claiming credit (Niedzwiecki 2016 ).
Piñera continued President Bachelet's early childhood education program, formalized the existing system of public kindergarten, and maintained the solidarity pension. Macri's administration continued the main public health programs and followed the law in automatically adjusting the CCT's value. However, the increase in the amount of transfer was not sufficient to keep up with inflation, creating policy drift and a de-facto reduction in benefit generosity. The healthcare sector in both countries also shows under-the-radar shifts in policy implementation and spending that threaten aspects of public health delivery. In Argentina, the government began to discontinue a program on sexual and reproductive health, while in Chile the elimination of waitlists was achieved by outsourcing treatment to the private sector. The increased levels of public transfers to the private sector in Chile may, with the passage of time, contribute to privatization creep.
Finally, these governments marginally expanded parts of the social state. The most notable expansion in Chile was the extension of maternity leave. Piñera's government also increased the years of mandatory schooling, included new illnesses to AUGE, and created a new CCT that built upon the previous one. Macri's main social policy achievement in his first months in office was the extension of non-contributory pensions and the increase in the value of pensions. His government also expanded the coverage of family allowances.
Our explanation sheds light on the variation in social policy reforms undertaken by Presidents Macri and Piñera, from maintenance, to policy drift, and expansion. The evidence confirms that policy legacies in both countries defined what kinds of reforms were necessary and feasible. The pension moratorium in Argentina was set to expire in 2016, and therefore the new government had to decide whether to continue with the existing system (with broad coverage but for a limited cohort) or to reform the benefit.
Macri's administration chose the latter. In Chile, existing gaps in the healthcare system prompted Piñera to address the problem of wait-lists. In education, the design of Chile The article does, however, suffer from limitations that constrain our ability to generalize this conclusion. First, the Macri administration has not completed its term in office. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether or not the right will continue to behave as it did during its first year. Second, both Argentina and Chile are stable democracies with a free press and a robust civil society. They are also middle-income states with established social welfare systems. These characteristics are not present in all Latin American countries, which may limit the applicability of the findings in other parts of the region. Finally, the absence of a severe crisis in both countries might be relevant. In a setting of a deep economic and/or political crisis, it is possible that right-wing governments will enjoy more leeway to retrench social programs. Brazil represents this scenario.
The economic and political crisis that ended in the impeachment and removal This paper has shown that in Argentina and Chile, where policy legacies and the opposition are strong, outright retrenchment has not occurred, suggesting that the gains made in Latin America during the early 2000s are likely to be maintained despite electoral turnover. This is significant as it suggests that Latin America's "left turn" had a lasting effect on social policy, citizen expectations, and attitudes about the state's role in protecting social rights.
